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Abstract 
Energy security has been a crucial concept in recent years, as an increasing demand for 
energy has resulted in many countries importing vast amounts of energy resources in 
order to satisfy growing demand. The purpose of this dissertation was to observe 
Finland and its energy dependence on Russia.  Geographically, Finland sits between 
Europe and Russia, and in certain respects this geographical location has reflected onto 
Finnish politics and economics. Most definitely the location is reflected in Finnish 
history, as being situated between two vast empires that were simultaneously at times 
trying to claim the land as their own left Finland with a sense of pride in independence. 
These historical ties have thus left a mark on the Finnish cultural, economic and 
political landscape, as Finland is indeed often viewed as the corridor between Europe 
and Russia.  
 
Finland lacks domestic sources of fossil fuel energy, and as a result, has to import 
substantial amounts of petrol, natural gas, and other energy sources, such as uranium for 
nuclear power. Hence, Finland has created for herself a dependency on the import 
sources and indeed an issue of energy security. Moreover, as a result of a lack of 
indigenous fossil fuels resources, Finland has come to rely on vast amounts of growing 
nuclear power in order to produce enough energy for rising consumption and the carbon 
intensive industry, a matter that creates further energy safety concerns. However, 
Finland’s energy security is not, at the time of writing, endangered by Russian 
geopolitical actions of recent months. Nevertheless, the effects and extent of these 
geopolitical disturbances are as of yet unknown, and thus energy security must remain a 
priority for Finnish policymakers, as should the advancement of more sustainable forms 
of energy instead of nuclear and CO
2
 fossil fuel formats. The goal should indeed be to 
increase the efficiency of energy in order to make the best out of the renewable energy 
sources at hand, and to stop frivolous energy consumption, instead of creating further 
hazardous nuclear power plants, or a reliance on an unstable country for energy imports. 
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1.1. General Introduction 
The concept of energy security has been at the forefront of European news in recent 
months, as the use of energy resources and supplies have been used as foreign policy 
tools by Russia. Russia, as an energy giant,  has indeed used energy policy as a tool, and 
one that has been an especially essential characteristic of the geopolitical landscape 
since Putin came to power in 2000 (Smith, 2014:77; Huotari, 2011:121; Cohen, 
2009:91; Fernandez, 2009:4029; Högselius, 2013:91). Energy security, according to the 
International Energy Agency, broadly speaking, is ‘adequate, affordable and reliable 
supplies of energy,’ and is thus seen as ‘a problem of risk management’ in terms of 
creating ‘an acceptable level [of] the risks and consequences of disruptions and adverse 
long-term market trends.’ (quoted in Esakova, 2012:40-1) This dissertation will seek to 
discover the ways in which European countries, with a special focus on Finland, are 
vulnerable due to the fact that fossil fuel imports largely originate from Russia (Urciuoli 
et al., 2014:57). Much of the world is facing an increasing demand for energy and hence 
it is progressively more important to secure chains of energy supply (Urciuoli et al., 
2014:57).  
 
The purpose of this dissertation will be to observe Finland and its energy dependence on 
Russia.  Geographically, Finland sits between Europe and Russia, and in certain 
respects this geographical location has been reflected in Finnish politics and economics. 
Most definitely the location is reflected in Finnish history, as being located between two 
vast empires that were simultaneously at times trying to claim the land as their own. 
These historical ties have thus left a mark on the Finnish cultural, economic and 
political landscape, as Finland is indeed often viewed as the corridor between Europe 




country. Some authors have even gone as far as stating that Finland lies in ‘Russia’s 
pocket,’ albeit a shocking claim but one that speaks volumes of the close relationship 
the two countries have shared since independence in 1917 (Luukkanen, 2010:7). 
 
Finland was chosen as the case study because of the researcher’s personal interests in 
the Finnish-Russian relations. Having grown up in Finland in the early 1990s, the 
proximity and relevance of Russia was ever present, as the Eastern neighbour was going 
through vast transformations – ones which also influenced Finland. Furthermore, having 
access to various databases and other resources through libraries in Finland proved to be 
an advantage. Also, three interviews were carried out with experts in the field. Each 
interview contributed tremendously to the overall context of the dissertation, and 
various quotes from each interview will be used throughout the dissertation.  
 
Through an exploration of the phenomenon and theories of energy security, Finland’s 
history and energy relations with Russia will be inspected in order to gain an 
understanding of how these relations may endanger Finland’s energy security. 
Furthermore, the focus will remain on imported energy, natural gas and renewable 
energies. This is due to the fact that natural gas has been the most prevalent in 
discussions of energy security on a general EU-level, as multiple countries import all 
natural gas reserves solely from Russia, including Finland. The idea of freeing Finland 
from Russian energy dependence through means of decreasing energy use, or diverting 
energy use to more sustainable forms such as biogas and others, is what reflects the 
secondary part of this dissertation. Indeed, while by no means a new concept, European 
energy security has indeed been highly publicized in recent months as even in Finland, 
while not the country most at risk of a collapse of natural gas imports, Russian actions 




Most of the writing on the subject will focus on a general EU versus Russia level and 
thus most theory found is applicable on a more general basis, and will be applied to the 
Finnish situation. In considering the Russian and European energy security, it can be 
said that in most circumstances of energy agreements between a member state and 
Russia, it is implied that for both sides security is a concern. Indeed, firstly, for the side 
of the EU member states, the security of gas supply is more important in order to avoid 
any disruptions supplies. Secondly, for Russia the concern is securing the demand for 
energy imports in order to have a stable market share in the EU despite possible 
geopolitical tensions (Le Cog and Paltseva, 2014:41). These two objectives, are indeed 
‘closely interrelated and represent the core of them mutual gas dependency between 
Russia and the EU.’ (Le Cog and Paltseva, 2014:41). 
 
The structure of the dissertation will be as follows; the introductory chapter will 
introduce the topic and the methodology being used in assessing Finland’s dependence 
on Russian energy and energy security. Chapter Two will briefly outline the historic and 
present day relations between Finland and Russia, while Chapter Three will sketch out 
Finland’s current energy situation. Chapter Four will include a discussion of the current 
geopolitical situation, how it has led to a further securitization of energy in terms of 
Russia and Ukraine and how this may all relate to Finland, while the final chapter will 
include a discussion of Finland’s place in energy security discussion and whether 
Finland’s position should lead to further investments in renewable energies, instead of 
being reliant on certain Russian energy imports, or nuclear power.  
 
Thus, the research question of whether Finland’s energy reliance on Russia is an energy 
risk, or whether it should be viewed as a further incentive towards energy independence 




represent the main problématique of the dissertation – whether Finland should seek gas 
and other energy resources elsewhere, as is partially already being done, or seek further 
renewable resources to replace natural gas and other fossil fuels energy needs.  
 
1.2. Research Methodology 
The study design chosen for this dissertation was that of a primarily desk-based research 
project, with three interviews, both semi-structured and structured ones. The research 
was conducted from a historical and political perspective, with a focus on how those 
have come to influence energy relations and energy security between Europe and 
Russia, and more specifically Finland and Russia.  Desk-based research drew on intense 
observations into the joint histories of both Finland and Russia, both through academic 
books and journal articles, newspaper articles, journalistic books, government 
documents, and databases based in the Helsinki University Library in Finland.   
 
Interview participants included a number of experts in different fields, but all with 
certain interests in the topic of Finnish-Russian relations, and on the phenomena of 
energy dependence and security. The participants were indeed chosen for this very 
specialty and expertise, whether it be in the field of economic relations, historic 
relations, or security and environmental matters. The interviewees were Charly 
Salonius-Pasternak, Jussi Uskola, and Antto Vihma. Salonius-Pasternak is a Senior 
Research Fellow in The Global Security research programme at the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs, and specializes in security and defence policies. Jussi Uskola is a 
Power Market Analyst at Fortum Oyj, a Finnish energy company that focuses on the 
Nordic and Baltic Countries and Russia. Finally, Antto Vihma also a Senior Research 




International Affairs, with special expertise in energy in external relations and global 
climate governance.  
 
Interview questions were drawn up and based around the wide ranging topic area of the 
dissertation. Specific questions were designed with specific participants in mind, but the 
same set of questions was presented to each participant in order to draw various 
opinions on all questions (see Appendix 2). The semi-structured interview that was 
carried out face to face followed indeed a semi-structured procedure, as questions were 
asked by the researcher, but conversation was allowed to be carried out freely during the 
interview. Prior to the interview, the participant was presented with the Information 
Sheet and the Consent Form (see Appendix 1) was signed by the participant. The 
information gathered from the interviews will be used throughout the dissertation as 
quotations.  
 
The two interviews that were carried out through emails, or virtual interviews, were all 
sent out with the same questions that were used during the semi-structured face to face 
interview in order to maintain the same focus and topics chosen for the design. The only 
difference between these virtual interviews, and the semi-structured interview, is that 
understandably there was less discussion, and they were more structured in a question 
and answer-arrangement. This resulted in a change in the role of the interviewer, as the 
environment and rules of the discussion were clearly set out alongside the questions, 
and a lack of visual and verbal cues allows for a less directive role for the interviewer 
(Turney, 2008:924; Egan, 2008:244). Seeing as the face to face interview and all email 
conducted interviews were fully transcribed and documented, both types had high 




used within the main body of the dissertation as quotations and sources, much like ones 
from books and journal articles, in order to enrich the arguments being made. 
 
While a fairly straightforward research project, certain difficulties and limitations were 
faced in the desk-based research and the interview portion of the project. Interviewers, 
while a very flexible and valid form of data collection, can be prone to bias from the 
interviewer (Guthrie, 2010:126).  However, these potential ethical issues were taken 
into strict consideration, and it was made sure that the questions presented to 
participants were not misleading, controversial or loaded.  
 
Furthermore, seeing as the questions asked participants to express their opinions, it is 
possible that professional or institutional bias from their end may have influenced 
answers, and thus the reliability of the data, as with any other qualitative data may be 
questioned. The problem of not being able to ‘dispassionately measure’ qualitative data 
presents itself here, as it is vulnerable to ‘varied interpretations and valuation.’ 
(Walliman, 2006:55). Place of employment - whether it be government funded think-
tanks or universities or energy companies - and political party alignment are all factors 
that may present biased opinions in this research project. This, however, can also be 
presented as a strength, as much of the discussion surrounding Finnish energy relations 
with Russia is carried out on strictly professional governmental platforms, so interviews 







2.1. Pre-Cold War Finland 
Much of Finland’s pre-Cold War history is that of being a proxy or an extension of 
either the Swedish or the Russian Empire, and thus Finland’s history is divisible into 
three periods; the Swedish period, the Russian period, and the independent period 
(Zetterberg, 2014). For over five centuries until the year 1809, Finland was part of the 
Swedish Empire, with trade and international relations ‘conducted under the Swedish 
flag.’ (Mead, 1991:308) Finland, while having some national identity, was a collection 
of provinces without being a national entity, and was governed from Stockholm 
(Zetterberg, 2014). In 1809 Sweden lost Finland to the Russian empire. While not 
having been a national entity during the Swedish period, under Russian rule Finland 
became an autonomous Grand Duchy (Zetterberg, 2014). The trade history between 
Finland and Russia stems from this period, and the state of the Russian economy has 
tended to influence the Finnish economy in various ways. This is reiterated by Hjerppe, 
who states that the biggest drops in the history of the Finnish GDP were in 1917 and 
1918, which were troubled years in Russia due to the revolutions (2010:50).  
 
In 1906 Finland went through a parliamentary reform, through which a unicameral 
parliament and universal suffrage were implemented, and in December of 1917, Finland 
became independent as Russia was in turmoil as a result of the events of the First World 
War (Zetterberg, 2014; Lavery, 2006:1). Finland did, as a consequence of Second 
World War peace settlements, lose ‘ten percent of its territory, had to resettle a tenth of 
its population within the revised borders, and was required to pay a massive reparations 
bill.’ (Mead, 1991:307) Finland has, since then, been able to transform her economy to 





2.2. Fall of the Soviet Union and accession to the EU 
Finland was the only European country that shared a border with the Soviet Union, but 
was not integrated into the Eastern Soviet bloc. After 1948, Finland’s position in the 
European community gradually developed, but policies remained cautious as the 
country tried to remain neutral in the eyes of the Soviet Union (Heikka, 2005:91; 
Tiilikainen, 2006:52). Indeed, formally Finland kept to a policy of neutrality in the Cold 
War, but in reality, the policy pursued was one which ‘first and foremost sought to 
appease the USSR’ (Lavery, 2006:12). Salonius-Pasternak stated that many lived in the 
hope ‘that many issues [could] be addressed at EU-Russia level, but while there is 
domestic criticism that Finland has given up its own Russia policy’ this does not seem 
to be the case (2014). The ensuing trade with the Soviet Union helped Finland transform 
its economy and become one the world’s wealthiest nations (Lavery, 2006:12). The cost 
of the trade with the Soviet Union was, however, Soviet influence in domestic politics, 
as the ‘comfortable niche between East and West began to disappear’ in the early 1980s 
(Lavery, 2006:12). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland dropped its policies 
of pragmatic neutrality and isolationism ‘almost overnight’ in order to create a secure 
place for Finland in the bigger European society (Heikka, 2005:91). This meant security 
cooperation with NATO countries, and ever since Finland has remained committed to a 
strong secure Europe with close transatlantic relations, but without joining NATO 
(Heikka, 2005: 91).  
 
Thus, as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet sphere of influence and a fear of an 
unstable post-Soviet Russia, Finland decided to take part in Western European political 
and economic integration by joining the EU in 1995 (Lavery, 2006:12). Up until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland has been the only industrialized market economy 




2007:137). According to Sutela, trade between the Soviet Union and Finland 
‘contributed to macroeconomic and business-level stability,’ due to the fact that 
contracts were signed on a state level, but on the Finnish side were implemented mostly 
by private companies, thus displaying both ‘national and private interests.’ (2007:138) 
 
While there were concerns about joining the EU, there were specific benefits to the 
union; first, membership would improve the economy due to new markets; second, 
national security would be enhanced without joining a military alliance; and finally, 
‘many Finns saw membership in the EU as a way of leaving Moscow’s political sphere 
of influence once and for all.’ (Lavery, 2006:156) In keeping with the Nordic balance 
theory, Finland did not needed to join NATO during the Cold War, as stability in the 
region was been maintained by Norway and Denmark’s NATO memberships, alongside 
the Finnish FCMA treaty with Russia, and a neutral Sweden in between (Heikka, 
2005:93). However, the end of the Cold War did not erase Finnish reluctance to 
integrate militarily, and Finland remains one of the only northern European countries 
with conscription (Lavery, 2006:12). 
 
In terms of the economy, the fall of the Soviet Union was traumatic for Finland, as after 
decades of high levels of economic growth, Finland’s economy faced an economic 
depression of 1930s proportions and one of the causes was the loss of a crucial trading 
partner (Lavery, 2006:157-8; Sairinen and Lindholm, 2005:61; Järvelä et al., 2011:19). 
Finland has regained Russia as a trading partner in the last decade and for many years 






2.3. Finland between East and West 
Finland’s place in Europe is an interesting one, and requires further clarification in order 
to understand why Finland may have specific aspects to consider in terms of policies 
concerning Russia. The ‘old geopolitical cliché’ of ‘Finland between East and West,’ 
while having lost most of its significance as a result of bipolarity being phased out in 
return for multipolarity in European relations, still holds a place in Finnish thought and 
history (Mead, 1991:308). The peripherality of Finland ‘on the northern frontiers of 
settlement and on the eastern marchlands of Western Europe’ is indeed significant for 
Finland’s history and current affairs (Mead, 1991:307). This significance, however, has 
somewhat diminished since Finland has been able to make remarkable successes as one 
of the Nordic countries, and then as a member of the European Union.  
 
However, the past does indeed sometimes seem to loom its less than attractive head, as 
when considering the current geopolitical events in Eastern Europe. Russia is acting as 
only an egotistical superpower would by enforcing its policies in various Eastern 
European countries, and Finland is being strict to follow EU policies, but while also 
maintaining bilateral relations with Russia. However, as a fully-fledged member of the 
Union, Finland has supported further integration into the EU, and has consistently 
avoided ‘drifting to the periphery of the Union’ by going against Union policies towards 
Russia (Sairinen and Lindholm, 2005:60).  
 
President J.K. Paasikivi once stated, ‘Russia might not always be a great power in the 
world, but it is always one for Finland.’ (Lavery, 2006:157) Indeed, the term 
‘finlandization’ has been applied to the period of time, and the way in which Russia was 
able to influence Finland, and according to Luukkanen, even today ‘honest conversation 




of the period.’ (2010:7) Even in terms of energy, during the Cold War as the first 
nuclear plants were under consideration, Finland felt compelled to look both East and 
West for guidance (Teräväinen et al., 2011:3435). According to Teräväinen et al., 
especially in terms of the Soviets to the East, the Finnish ‘government felt compelled to 
commission two Russian light-water pressurised reactors’, while two reactors were 
ordered from Sweden (2011:3435). 
 
Russia has also been a positive influence on the Finnish economy as a trade partner. 
Flourishing trade and linked economies have characterised the Finnish-Russian relations 
in recent years (Smith, 2006:23). However, these successes are shadowed by Russia’s 
growing tendency to use economic means as foreign policy tools in order to dominate 
(Smith, 2006:23). Indeed, on a European level, Finland can be characterized as a 
‘friendly pragmatist’, a country that sustains a close relationship with Russia, a 
relationship where business interests are generally put ahead of political goals (Leonard 
and Popescu, 2007:2).  
 
2.4. Economic success and exceptional path to industrialization 
Finland has in the last half a century been able to create one of the world’s wealthiest 
economies, stemming from an ‘ability to export products to larger markets.’ (Lavery, 
2006:8) While being reliant on various imports, wood is Finland’s greatest resource 
seeing as forestry products pioneered Finland’s exports, while in recent decades 
electronics and information technology have taken their position as top exports as well 
(Lavery, 2006:9; Joas, 1997:120). The rise in technological exports is indeed what has 





Finland industrialized in a way different to most other countries. The common formula 
for industrialization in economic history has been one of changing the energy system in 
use from ‘renewable to non-renewable sources,’ and this has indeed been seen as the 
‘indispensable precondition for successful industrialization.’ (Kunnas and Myllyntaus, 
2009:155) However, according to Kunnas and Myllyntaus, Finland was the ‘odd man 
out’ because industrialization ‘was based on renewable, indigenous energy sources’ 
which consisted of a blend of ‘fuel wood, wood refuse and hydropower’ due to the lack 
of domestic sources of fossil fuels such as coal and oil (2009:155). It was not until the 
1960s that due to rising energy consumption, fossil fuel use came to surpass the use of 
renewable sources (Kunnas and Myllyntaus, 2009:177).  Kunnas and Myllyntaus 
attribute the late transition on the immense wood resources, which allowed the 
postponing of the use of fossil fuels because firewood was cheaper than coal (2009:177-
8). Thus, Finnish industrialization was based on renewable energies, which lay the 
foundations for current extensive renewable energy methods, as will be discussed in the 




3. FINLAND’S CURRENT ENERGY ‘CAKE’ 
3.1. Finnish climate  
Climate and natural resources are known to have a major impact on the energy 
availability, energy usage and energy politics of a country, and Finland’s climate 
presents certain issues for energy consumption.  Finland is situated in the North East 
peripheral of Europe, with high altitudes and a very harsh climate with a constricted 
variety of natural resources (Mead, 1991:307) Indeed, approximately a third of the 
country is north of the Arctic Circle (Lavery, 2006:2). The northern location quite 
obviously has a significant impact on the country’s climate, as winters are long, dark 
and cold, while summers are very warm (Lavery, 2006:2). Thus, the lack of indigenous 
hydrocarbon energy sources, namely fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal, means such 
resources must either be imported, or alternatives for each resource must be found (IEA, 
2013:9). Most bedrock in Finland outdates organic life on earth, and thus are lacking in 
fossil fuels necessary for energy production in modern industrial societies (Singleton, 
1998:5). 
 
3.2. Energy usage and supply 
According to the International Energy Agency, Finland has one of the largest energy 
consumption per capita rates in the world (IEA, 2013:9). This is 89% higher than the 
EU 2008 average, and is mostly due to the intense need for heating during long, cold 
winters, carbon intensive industry, and high requirements for transportation per capita 
due to the low density of the population as seen in Graph 1 (IAEA, 2012). Finland’s 
energy consumption is estimated to rise slightly within the next decades, and thus the 
securitization of energy sources is vitally important (Enerdata, 2014). Indeed, seeing as 




manufacturing, electronics and chemical sectors’ alongside paper and forestry industry, 
energy security is a significant consideration (IEA, 2013:9).  
 
Graph 3.1. Energy consumption by sectors in 2010 
 
Graph from IAEA, 2012. 
 
Graph 3.2. Total primary energy supply (TPES) – Finland 2013 
 
Data from International Energy Agency, 2013:15. 
 
The total primary energy supply (TPES) of Finland in 2011 consisted of 34.7 million 
tonnes of oil-equivalents (Mtoe), of which 26.5% were renewables, 26.4% oil, 17.4% 
26,5 % 















nuclear, 11.6% coal, 9.7% natural gas, 5.8% peat, and 3.6 % other, with a 7.8% rise 
since the year 2000, as seen in Graph 2. Per capita, TPES equals to 6.5 tonnes of oil-
equivalent (toe), which is indeed high compared to the IEA average of 4.6. toe (IEA, 
2013:15). 
 
From this energy supply, the electricity that is generated originates from various 
different sources, which are displayed below in Graph 3. Due to lack of indigenous 
fossil fuels, Finland relies on a lot of energy imports. According to Enerdata, Finland’s 
energy independence in 2014 is 49.8%, meaning half of Finnish energy supplies are 
imported (Enerdata, 2014). Crude oil and other oil derived products make up the 
majority of imports, but also coal,  natural gas, and uranium are imported (IAEA, 2012). 
In terms of electricity, the Nordic electricity market imports significant amounts – 
mostly from Russia. Furthermore, there is an upwards trend of electricity imports from 
Russia to Finland specifically (Kara, 2008:196). 
 
Graph 3.3. Electricity generation sources 
 



















Finland’s longer-term strategy for decarbonizing, and decreasing energy dependence on 
other countries, has come about in such a way that two cleaner sources, renewable 
energy and nuclear energy, have been prioritized  in order to ‘[meet] national climatic 
objectives.’ (IEA, 2013:10-11)  
 
3.2.1. Nuclear energy 
The first of the decarbonizing goals set out by the Finnish government is the further 
development of the already significant nuclear power stock, which has been favoured by 
most Finnish governments during the years as it has allowed for a diversification of the 
energy mix and thus enhanced energy security (IEA, 2013:11). The history of Finnish 
nuclear power stems back to the late 1970s and early 1980s when the first two nuclear 
reactors began commercial operation, one built with Swedish built reactors, and the 
other with Soviet originating reactors (IAEA, 2012; Kidd, 2007:200). Indeed, Finland’s 
nuclear history relates very much to the cultural and historical nature of the country, as 
during the Cold War Finland maintained relations with both East and West (Nuttall, 
2010:169). Nuclear power is indeed favoured by a majority of the Finnish government, 
and this is due to fact that the ‘process of nuclear fission releases immense amounts of 
energy,’ but also without ‘many of the pollutants’ of various other energy productions, 
such as nitrogen oxides, sulphur, or carbon (Scurlock, 2007:9) 
 
Finland is one of the only EU member countries that has future plans to expand nuclear 
power plant activities (IEA, 2013:11). Indeed, after the Fukushima disaster, many 
European countries, such as Germany and Italy, have announced ‘nuclear exit’ 
strategies (Christie, 2012:63).  If the planned power plants are completed, Finland will 
have seven operating nuclear plants, and the share of electricity that nuclear power 
produces would rise from 28%, to over 30% in 2020, and by 2025 even possibly 60% 




of (majoritarily) electricity production, and nuclear safety measure procedures have 
even been exported to Eastern European countries that are running nuclear power plants 
that were built using Soviet technologies (IAEA, 2012). Indeed, the majority of nuclear 
power is used to produce electricity, which in turn is used to heat homes and businesses 
(Ferguson, 2009:299). However, given that the fifth nuclear reactor will not be enough 
to meet future electricity consumption needs, Finland’s energy resources are will, in the 
future, be vulnerable to energy imports (Kara et al., 2008:197-8).   
 
However, nuclear waste issues must be addressed, and are bound to become a further 
issue as the topic of the construction of the further two power plants become more 
current. Nuclear waste storage has been largely successful in Finland (Macfarlane, 
2011:32). The Finnish state has set up a Nuclear Waste Management Fund, to which 
energy companies make annual payments, which then, while operating under the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, covers all measures having to do with 
nuclear waste – namely treatment, storage, disposal and plant decommissioning (IAEA, 
2012). Furthermore, according to Nuttall, a feeling of trust and transparency between 
local communities, the nuclear sector, and also policy makers, is what has the Finnish 
nuclear sector so successful, and also so accepted amongst Finnish society (2007:230). 
 
3.2.2. Renewable Energy 
Finland is renowned for its success in commissioning sustainable and renewable energy 
sources, and is well on track to meet the ambitions of the EU’s 20-20-20 goals (IEA, 
2013:10). This, as mentioned in the previous chapter stems from the historically high 
share of the use of peat in energy production. Graph 4 above  illustrates the history of 




of different energy resources has changed, but the shares of oil and wood based 
renewable fuels have stayed rather constant.  
 
Graph 3.4. Finnish energy supply 1970-2009 
 
Table from IAEA report, 2012, their data from Statistics Finland. 
 
As the second out of the two longer-term strategies adopted and prioritized by Finnish 
authorities, renewable energy has created a very striving renewables programme, as the 
aim is to increase the amount of renewable energy to 38% by the year 2020 (IEA, 
2013:11). With over 80 percent of the country covered in forests, Finland has 
undeniably made use of the forestry in order to meet targets for renewable energy. The 
plans are for the forestry sector to ‘contribute half of the additional 38 terawatt hours 
between 2005 and 2020.’ (IEA, 2013:11) Indeed, the use of ‘forest fuels’ in the 
production of energy, according to Åkerman et al., had, by the year 2005, tripled in five 
years (2005:596). 
 
The renewable energies that are derived from the forestry sector consist of energy from 
forest chip usage and various other wood-based sources, but other renewable energy 




(IEA, 2013:11). Wind is a further renewable energy that Finland has possible great 
ambitions to develop, as the capabilities for wind production exists, but the actual 
production has remained below 1% (Enerdata, 2014:22). Indeed, Finland has ‘very 
limited and short experience in tariffs for wind energy,’ as they are in place but have not 
been functioning to their full extent due to various other administrative hurdles, such as 
land use policies (Vihma, 2014). Finnish biogas production has mostly (70%) grown out 
of recovery plants of landfill gas. Biogas production has remained small, but several 
projects have been established to increase annual production capacities of biogas (IEA, 
2013:67).  
 
3.2.3. Natural Gas 
The use of natural gas in Finland is vital to the overall considerations of energy security, 
as natural gas is the cause of energy security concerns in Europe in the current 
geopolitical climate. As an energy form, natural gas has substantially lower levels of 
emissions, and is, as a result, viewed as a ‘low carbon energy system.’ (Faas et al., 
2011:16) With no domestic production of natural gas, apart from a minor biogas 
production industry, the Finnish gas market stands isolated with no transport 
connections to other EU states (IEA, 2013:67). Finland imports natural gas from Russia 
through a single pipeline, opened in 1974 with a single entry point from Russia (IEA, 
2013:12, 67; Youngs, 2009:95; Kunnas, and Myllyntaus, 2009:177). Due to the market 
isolation, the Finnish gas network has received a special derogation from the European 
Union’s Gas Directive.  
 
Gasum Oy, the Finnish natural gas monopoly, is the sole owner and operator of the 
pipeline network from Russia and across Finland (IEA, 2013:12). Incidentally, Gasum 




owns 31% of Gasum, Gazprom, the Russian gas company, who owns 25%. Also, the 
Finnish State owns 24%, while German owned E.On Ruhrgas has 20% ownership of 
Gasum (IEA, 2013:69). The current agreement made with the Russian company 
Gazprom Export is valid until 2026, and the prices of transports are linked to ‘oil, coal, 
and domestic energy prices.’ (IEA, 2013:67) The contract between Gasum Oy and 
Gazprom is fairly inflexible, and negotiations are being held for a more malleable 
format due to the downward trends in the domestic gas usage in the past few years, but 
with possible higher peak demands (IEA, 2013:67).  
 
Finland imports 4.1 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas from Russia, which is 
9.7% of Finnish TPES and in 2011 accounted for 12.9% of the production of electricity. 
Moreover, out of the 4.1 bcm; 60.6% goes to power generation, 27.4% to industry, 9.5% 
to energy sector, and the rest to services, residential and transport (IEA; 2013:67). This 
breakdown of gas demand differs in comparison to other European countries, hence 
making Finland a very different gas consumer to continental Europe as domestic use is 
only 1% as houses are not fitted with gas boilers or cookers. Instead, over 60% of gas is 
used in power generating and CHP plants (IEA, 2013:68). The demand for natural gas 
has historically risen from a 1974 demand of 0.5 bcm, to 5 bcm in 2005, and a slight 
decrease to 4.1 bcm in 2011. The usage of gas rises significantly during the winter 
months, for use in CHP and heat plants (IEA, 2013:68). 
 
Alternative supply routes for gas have been considered planned (IEA, 2013:12) One 
alternative gas pipeline, the Balticconnector, would be built in order to connect Finland 
and Estonia, and thus connect Finland to the Baltic networks (Enerdata, 2014:21). 
While the amount of gas being used in Finland is slight in comparison to the various 




responsible for access to natural gas, the security of the energy source is questionable 
and the market very constrained. 
 
3.3. Energy and Environmental Policy 
Finland ranked 18
th
 out of 178 countries in the 2014 Environmental performance Index, 
showing that in a global comparison Finland performs extremely well in terms of 
environmental measures, even if industry and per capita energy consumption are very 
high (EPI, 2014). Historically, Finnish environmental policy has been of a high standard 
since the 1980s (Sairinen, 2003:73). In the long run, decarbonizing has been taken as 
Finland’s main environmental objective. A goal shared by the other neighbouring 
Nordic countries, Finland aims to decarbonize by intensifying its measures to lower 
consumption and the creation of cleaner means of production (IEA, 2013:10) Hence, it 
comes as no surprise that Finland ranked fourth-lowest in terms of the lowest shares of 
fossil fuels included in the energy mix, and the highest in terms of the amount of 
biofuels (IEA, 2010:10). In terms of environmental performance in comparison with 
other Nordic countries, relatively, Finland has lagged behind the other three. This, 
according to Salonius-Pasternak was due to the ‘strong heavy industry [having] left its 
marks, and [continuing] to do so.’ (2014) 
 
While economic crises may usually have a negative impact on the environmental policy 
measures and decarbonisation attempts, the most recent economic crisis and structural 
changes that occurred as a result, actually influenced Finland’s emissions profile 
positively, and since then, Finnish government has been seen to adopt means of 
decarbonisation – in transport, agriculture, and heating – that go well beyond emissions 
reductions targets set out by the European Union. Within fiscal policy, contributions 




energy sources (IEA, 2013:10). Despite such successes in implementing and correlating 
between different sectors in decarbonizing society, Finland still, as mentioned 
previously, has one of the highest per capita rates of consumption in the world, has 
reliable but problematic nuclear sources of energy, and imports large amounts of energy 
resources from elsewhere in the world (Kara et al., 2008:194). 
 
Since joining the EU, Finland’s energy policies have become cohesive with those of the 
community – ‘targets are aligned with the Union’s … and generally comply with EU 
legislation’ (IEA, 2013:11). In terms of energy, the EU’s 2009 ‘third package’ was 
adopted with the idea of securing the appropriate functioning of the energy markets, and 
the cross-border trade that goes along with it (IEA, 2013:11). The purpose of the third 
package legislation was, according to the IEA, ‘ensuring the proper functioning of 
energy markets and enhancing cross-border trade and access to diversified sources of 
energy.’ (2013:11) 
 
In terms of the Finnish energy markets, the IEA states that due to the liberalization of 
the electricity markets and its inclusion in the competitive Nord Pool, Finland’s energy 
market is functioning relatively well (IEA, 2013:11). However, issues arise upon 
considering the Finnish natural gas market, as the arrangement of the market is ‘in clear 
contradiction with the EU vision.’ (IEA, 2013:12) The EU has granted the country a 
‘derogation’ from EU rules concerning the internal market, which state that a country 
should not be wholly dependent on a single importer for an entire energy source (IEA, 
2013:12). Seeing as Finland’s natural gas supply has a sole importer, Gasum, and comes 
from a sole source, Russia, the energy security of Finnish natural gas is very 





Finland can be defined as an ‘actively inclusive state where multi-party coalition 
governments and expansive corporatism have ensured consensual policy orientation and 
a broad interest representation in official arenas of policy preparation,’ but due to the 
economic dependency of interest organisations, generally their influence has remained 
limited (Teräväinen et al., 2011:3435). Indeed, in terms of energy policy, according to 
Teräväinen et al., the decision-making processes are in the hands of a few, mainly the 
Ministry of Employment and Economy (MEE) (2011:3435). This has sparked criticism, 
as the MEE’s influence in energy policy has been seen as a conflict of interests 
(Teräväinen et al., 2011:3435). 
 
Uskola stated that the ‘energy market has become increasingly politics-driven’ and that 
policy makers can be decisive in terms of planning ‘which investments will be 
profitable’ (2014). However, the influence goes vice versa, as according to Vihma, an 
influential group exists in Finnish business that is ‘making big money in Russian trade 
and of course they have their voice in policy.’ (2014). Moreover, Salonius-Pasternak 
stated that, private businesses also have great influence in the upkeep of Finnish-
Russian energy relations (2014). Thus, as Finland ranks high in terms of world 







4. ENERGY SECURITY 
4.1. Theoretical frameworks of energy security 
Energy security is a multifaceted concept that includes various ‘concerns linking 
energy, economic growth and political power’ (Esakova, 2012:39). Indeed, definitions 
of the term range ‘from narrow issues of physical supply distribution to broader ones 
involving the economic, environmental, and political consequences of changes to 
energy markets.’ (Drever and Stang, 2013:1) Concerns surrounding energy security 
have, in recent years, arisen once again due to the growing need for abundant energy 
resources, even despite recent economic downturns (Luft and Korin, 2009:1). 
 
The theories surrounding energy security have mostly stemmed from political theories 
of strategic security studies, or international regime theory (Cherp and Jewell, 2011:3; 
Esakova, 2012:19).  International regime theory recognises the idea of the relationships 
of interdependence, which can be defined as ‘situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different countries.’ (Keohane and Nye, 
quoted in Esakova, 2012:19) Interdependence is a deeper concept than simply 
interconnectedness, as, according to Keohane and Nye, it involves the ‘flows of money, 
goods, people, and messages across international boundaries’ (quoted in Esakova, 
2012:20). According to Keohane and Nye, it is indeed the ‘relationships of 
interdependence’ that occur within international regimes, which in turn are influenced 
by ‘networks, rules, norms and procedures that regularize behaviour and control its 
effects.’ (Esakova, 2012:25) Thus, based on the above definition, it can be argued that 
interdependence is the essence of energy security. Keohane’s and Nye’s concepts of 
interdependence rely heavily on realist presumptions of states being ‘coherent unites 




instrument of policy,’ while international organisations play a minor role, and military 
treats are more dominant goals than economic and social affairs (Esakova, 2012:48). 
 
Hughes’ concept of the ‘four ‘R’s of energy security’ includes the features review, 
reduce, replace, and restrict (2009:2459). Review consists of understanding the 
problem, by reviewing ‘existing sources, suppliers, sources of energy and 
infrastructure,’ and consists of surveying future possible energy sources (Hughes, 
2009:2459). Reducing, quite simply, consists of reducing energy demand, which in turn 
has a positive effect on energy security as countries become less dependent on 
importation of energy, and it can be achieved ‘through energy conservation or energy 
efficiency, or both.’ (Hughes, 2009:2460) The third concept, replace, is essential due to 
the fact that the impact of reduction can be limited due to the fact that all systems need a 
certain level of energy to work and thus, according to Hughes, ‘in addition to reducing 
demand, improving energy security also requires the replacement of insecure energy 
supplies with secure ones’ (2009:2460). Finally, restrict consists of ‘the intent to limit 
new demand to secure sources.’ (Hughes, 2009:2460) 
 
4.2. Energy security between Europe and Russia  
The energy relationship between Europe and Russia is of mutual importance to both 
sides, and while mutually beneficial to both, it has proved problematic. Indeed, the 
dependence on Russian energy imports, to Europeans, is unsettling (Cohen, 2009:92). 
Furthermore, according to Pedersen, three main overall concerns exists when 
considering European dependency on Russian energy; first, the impending gas cut offs, 
second, non-competitive prices, and finally, rampant corruption (2014: 15). Smith 




viewed as a great European power with commonalities between it and other European 
countries, and second, as something ‘strange, alien and threatening.’ (2006:7) 
 
Historically, Russia has used its natural resources as a power tool in the former Soviet 
areas of Europe (Huotari, 2011:121; Högselius, 2013:91). However, the recent actions 
carried out by Russia have been a significant change in the EU-Russia relationship. 
Russia of the 1990s was perceived as weak, broken shadow of a country, while at the 
moment the country is framed as a powerful world power (Huotari, 2011:121). This 
change has been attributed to President Putin’s aggressive policies and stable political 
system, and also the changing world energy market (Huotari, 2011:121; Esakova, 
2012:19). 
 
As a result of the uneven distribution of natural resources in Europe, many European 
countries have their resources transported over long distances (Arentsen, 2004:69).  
Indeed, ‘nearly all EU members are heavily dependent on imports of fossil fuels, 
particularly oil and natural gas’ and, thus, minimising the possibilities of supply 
shortfalls has become a priority to many member states (Voutilainen, 2008:124-5). The 
gas trade between the European Union and Russia has gained the most attention as a 
matter of energy security. Approximately 20% of EU gas exportation has originated 
from Russia in the last few decades, and for various member states the share has 
surpassed 90% (Le Cog and Paltseva, 2014:41). 
 
Arentsen suggests that the establishment of a common European market is an 
achievable and desirable goal, seeing as there is an ‘extensive cross-border flow of gas 
in Europe’ (2004:69). However, such a market would be under vast restraints from 




within the EU (Arentsen, 2004:69). No lasting agreements have been made between 
these two independent partners, Russia and the EU, and the focus of the relations, 
according to Smith, is ‘how a politicization of energy security has emerged.’ (2014:77) 
The energy relationship between the two is indeed one where security remains a 
concern for both sides; on one hand, the ‘security of gas supply for the EU, who wants 
to avoid Russian gas supply disruption,’ while on the other, for Russia the concern is of 
‘the security of gas demand’ in order to maintain a secure market share in the EU (Le 
Cog and Paltseva, 2014:41). 
 
In terms of the interdependence theory, gas, as opposed to oil, is an energy source 
which creates a great interdependence between supplier and importer. Gas pipes are 
inflexible, and thus a strong interdependence exists (Esakova, 2012:20). Hence, a 
mutual interdependence creates the framework for mutual cooperation between the 
different actors involved in natural gas trading, and possibly shows why natural gas 
supply disruptions and conflicts are so rare.  
 
Most agreements between Russia and various EU countries have been bilateral, despite 
efforts in recent years, especially after the economic crisis of 2008-9, to reverse this 
trend and build a more ‘common normative energy agreement’ (Smith, 2014:77).  
Indeed, the distinctive multilateral nature of the EU has proved difficult for Russia to 
deal with, as the country tends to prefer to conduct agreements on a bilateral basis, 
rather than multilateral (Smith, 2006:12; Vihma, 2014). The Russian discomfort with 
multilateral processes, according to Smith, stems from the idea that Russia feels 
uncomfortable in negotiations where it ‘would be one amongst others, small and big 





While the realist view of energy security tends to focus on one state having more 
influence on another through the usage of energy dependence, this perspective cannot 
wholly be applied to the current relationship between the EU and Russia. This, 
according to Le Cog and Paltseva, is because ‘there are gains from trade for the gas 
relationship between the EU and Russia’ and ‘Russia is no less dependent on the EU’ 
(2014:41). Indeed, approximately half of Russia’s profits from energy exports originate 
from the EU area, and the EU markets are necessary in order for Russia to ‘facilitate 
development and growth’ of its energy exportation (Le Cog and Paltseva, 2014:41). 
Indeed, some have gone even as far as to claim that Russia is more dependent on the 
EU, than the EU on Russia (Le Cog and Paltseva, 2014:41).  
 
However, exceptions without a doubt are apparent, as is seen in the various gas-related 
disagreements between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, geopolitical and economic tensions 
between energy partners can cause tensions (Le Cog and Paltseva, 2014:41). Events in 
Eastern Europe in 2006 reminded the rest of Europe that energy security should not be 
overlooked, as the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine brought gas supplies to 
Ukraine to a halt (Youngs, 2009:24; Froggatt, 2007:178; Huotari, 2011:121; Drever and 
Stang, 2013:1). Ukraine’s gas relations with Russia have demonstrated the vulnerability 
disruptions can crate, as ‘the vulnerability had a variety of domestic consequences’ 
through which ‘the state was robbed of valuable resources’ which further weakened a 
weak state and ‘made it less able to get a grip on the energy system and its problems.’ 
(Balmaceda, 2008:65) Gas transports were simultaneously thus halted to multiple 
countries in the rest of continental Europe, as the gas pipes run through Ukraine, which 
undoubtedly led to considerations of energy security across the wider context of 
European energy (Le Cog and Paltseva, 2014: 43). Furthermore, the events of 2006 led 




These events, according to Cohen, were examples of Russia proving ‘that it is willing to 
hike up oil and gas prices, engage in anti-free market practices and use energy as a 
foreign policy tool.’ (Cohen, 2009: 91)  
 
In terms of energy interdependence, according to Esakova, ‘there is a fundamental link 
between interdependence and cooperation in the field’ which is crucial in terms of 
regime building, but also entails the concept of some actors being more dependent than 
others (Esakova, 2012:15-6). Thus, in order to develop energy security, it seems an 
international regime is necessary in order to have control and survey the business of 
energy security. The IEA has in recent years warned of various dangers in energy 
security. One of these is the growing influence of national energy companies becoming 
increasingly state controlled (Esakova, 2012:17). This is a growing concern in Russia, 
as the Kremlin seems to have an influence in most matters. 
 
4.3. Current geopolitical climate and change in Russia 
Some would seek to blame Russia for the major conflicts that have occurred in recent 
years in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the blame is often placed on Russian President 
Vladimir Putin who came into power in 2000 (Nygren, 2006:125). Indeed, the changes 
in Russian foreign policy has been credited to the apparent change Putin made to ‘very 
consciously and from the very outset of his first presidential term [to distance] himself 
from the more traditional Russian geo-political thinking,’ and especially those of his 
predecessor Boris Yeltsin (Nygren, 2006:125-6; Lo, 2003:11). The major shift, 
according to Nygren, was that Putin changed the Russian foreign policy from having a 





As mentioned in previous sections, Russia finds it difficult to deal with multilateral 
entities such as the EU where negotiations place Russia amongst other smaller countries 
(Smith, 2006:14). This, according to Smith, has become ‘increasingly evident in Russia-
EU relations, especially during Putin’s second presidency.’ (2006:14). Indeed, to this 
day, Russia seems influenced by its past, despite seemingly understanding the concept 
and importance of international organisations and multilateralism (Smith, 2006:14). The 
change in Russia during Putin’s presidency has manifested itself in such a way that 
Russia has evolved into a ‘state-centred one-party system with strong autocratic 
tendencies’ and control over political, economic and societal spheres, from being a 
‘pluralist state in flux’ (Smith, 2006:16-7). Therefore, concerns have been raised about 
the weakening of democracy in Russia. Most recently, Russia’s involvement in Ukraine 
has raised international discussions surrounding the single-party rule state led by 
President Putin.  
 
As a result of military involvement in Ukrainian civil unrest since February of 2014, 
and especially since the shooting down of a Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 as a result 
of, most likely Russian-provided arms and Russian-backed separatists, the US and the 
EU announced various punitive sanctions on Russia (The Economist, 2014). In return, 
Putin has ordered retaliatory sanctions on various imports from the countries that 
imposed the original sanctions on Russia (BBC, 2014). This, according to the 
Economist, signals the end of ‘a 25-year-long quest to make Moscow a partner of the 
West.’ (The Economist, 2014) Indeed, relations between the East and West have soured 
in recent months, and there is cause for concern, as the West has tended to remain 
‘reluctant to criticise Russia as not to upset the Russians, for a number of reasons.’ 
(Smith, 2006:18) In terms of energy security, the effects of these sanctions on energy 




relations between Russia and the EU degenerate further, there is serious cause for 
concern.  
 
4.4. Finnish energy security 
In terms of the events of recent months in Eastern Europe, Finland has had to consider 
how it may have to deal with some of the consequences. The geographical location of 
Finland, as stated previously, places Finland as the only non-former Soviet European 
country to share a long border with Russia. This, combined with a history of dominance, 
economic ties, and special relationships, has led to considerations of Finland’s position 
in Europe, and whether it is in Europe or between Russia and Europe.  
 
The lack of indigenous hydrocarbon energy resources indicates that energy policies and 
securing energy resources becomes an imperative policy concern for Finnish 
policymakers (IEA, 2013:9). In order to secure energy resources, the Finnish 
government has taken various steps; firstly, by creating emergency reserves, and 
secondly, by diversifying the energy mixture. Indeed, emergency response capabilities 
are outlined in the 1992 Act on Security of Supply, which states that the country must 
‘hold alternative fuel for oil and gas disruptions that march at least five months of 
consumption.’ (IEA, 2013:9) The IEA stockholding requirement standard is to have 
emergency reserves for 90 days, so Finland has practically doubled that requirement. 
Furthermore, in order to diversify, Finland has created an electricity production mix 
where renewable, nuclear and hydrocarbon energies are all used (IEA, 2013:9). Indeed, 
by creating an electricity framework by integrating into the Nordic electricity market, 
Finland has consolidated its energy resilience in this respect (IEA, 2013:9). However, a 
weakness in Finnish natural gas sourcing security presents itself in the lack of a large-




storage for daily balancing and peak shaving’ (IEA, 2013:72). Thus, according to the 
IEA, the fact that Latvia has significant natural gas storage facilities, the LNG terminal 
through Estonia would allow access to these vast gas resources in Latvia (2013:72). 
 
The IEA states that a further manner, in which a country may avoid dependence on 
energy importation, is to reduce the domestic need for energy (2013:9). Finland has, 
according to the IEA, been ‘resourceful in initiating and implementing significant 
energy efficiency programmes’ as the 2009 Climate and Energy Strategy set out a goal 
that would reverse the growth in energy consumption, with an 11% decrease by the year 
2020 (2013:9) 
 
Seeing as due to the cold climate and dark winters, a major share of Finland’s energy 
consumption goes to the lighting and heating of buildings. Efforts have been plentiful to 
decrease energy consumption; building codes have been updated for future builds, and 
the current housing stock has had subsidies put in place to improve the energy 
efficiency of buildings, with future plans being made for the transport sector which 
remains ‘highly oil-dependent.’ (IEA, 2013:10) Indeed, by developing the transport 
sector, Finland would be able to decrease the need for imported fossil fuels. 
Furthermore, in regards to the heating and lighting of houses, Finland has, due to the 
immense need for energy consumption in this sector, created ‘the world’s most 
extensive and efficient combined heat and power (CHP) industries and district heating 
networks,’ which has turned this these ‘vulnerabilities into strengths’ (IEA, 2013:10). 
Indeed, CHP has come to account for approximately half of the heating production, and 
a third of electricity production, which is above the 10% EU average (IEA, 2013:10; 
Kara et al., 2008:194) Furthermore, the lack of fossil fuels has resulted in Finnish 




available in Finland, namely peat. Peat, as shown in Graph 2, accounts for ~6% of total 
energy consumption and is a rare form of energy supply, with a negative environmental 
impact due to its high levels of carbon-intensity, but it does provide heat for around a 
million homes (IEA, 2013:10). 
 
As mentioned previously, in order to diversify gas supplies to Finland to end isolation 
and derogations in the Eastern Baltic Sea Region, plans are under consideration and in 
progress for the Balticconnector between Estonia and Finland under the Baltic Energy 
Market Interconnection Plan (IEA, 2013:71). The LNG terminal is estimated to be at 
full working capacity by the end of the year 2018 (IEA, 2013:72). However, issues have 
arisen concerning the timetabling of the construction, as EU bureaucracy has 
complicated the process (Salonius-Pasternak, 2014). This terminal and crucial 
connection to mainland European gas will indeed increase Finnish energy security, as 
no longer will the country be dependent on one sole source of natural gas.  
What also becomes apparent for Finnish companies, or any companies in general, when 
investing abroad is the fact that for determining the location of new investments, 
security risk assessment is key. However, in terms of Finnish companies investing in 
geopolitically threatening Russia, according to Uskola, ‘security evaluations are done 
on a continuous basis, not based on specific events’ and that Fortum Oyj, is ‘monitoring 
the developments in Russia, and change [their] policies as needed.’ (2014) 
 
Thus, the increase in investment in the nuclear industry has been used by Finnish policy 
makers as the guarantee for securing of domestic energy supply, which in turn would 
decrease the need for a reliance on energy importation, while meeting the European 
climate change commitments (Mitchell and Woodman, 2007:163). Indeed, traditional 




have been pushed aside, and instead is portrayed as a solution to energy security and 
climate change (Teräväinen et al., 2011:3434). 
 
While Finland may not be in a similar situation as Ukraine or other eastern European 
countries, the risks in dealing with Russia in energy trade are ever present. This, 
however, is not to be exaggerated, as no disturbances have occurred between Finland 
and Russia in energy trading. During the last two decades of gas imports to Finland via 
the pipeline from Russia, only one disruption has occurred. The disruption lasted a day 
in the summer of 2007, and was due to a pipeline accident near St Petersburg (IEA, 
2013:71). However, Finland does retain special relations with Russia as a result of the 
long history of cooperation, and Finnish policies on all international levels always 





5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1. Discussion 
The current geopolitical climate has forced discussions of energy security within 
Europe. Indeed, issues stemming from disputes between Russia and Ukraine from the 
year 2006 have arisen to the surface, as disturbances between the two countries began in 
early 2014 once more, as Russia aimed to support the separatist militants that are 
seeking independence for parts of Ukraine. The 2006 disturbances highlighted the risks 
of dependence, and especially the risks in relying on few energy suppliers (Bahgat, 
2006:961).  
 
The sanctions that the USA and the EU are placing on Russia currently are in response 
to Russia’s actions in Ukraine have caused much discussion in Finnish media 
concerning their effect on Finland (YLE, 2014b). The Finnish Centre Party has 
expressed concerns, that while the sanctions do not directly have links to Finland, they 
could have ‘major consequences’ on the Finnish economy due to the fact that according 
to analysis carried out by the European Union, the Russian economy will weaken by 
five percent (YLE, 2014b). Indeed, the chair of the Centre Party has warned Finnish 
foreign policy makers from underestimating the influence that a shrinking of the 
Russian economy will have on Finland (YLE, 2014b).  Furthermore, the retaliatory 
sanctions placed by Russia on food imports will affect Finland gravely, as, for example, 
dairy producers expect for exports to decrease to a fifth of previous year’s levels (YLE, 
2014a). Thus, while sanctions are not concerned with energy as of now, it remains 
unclear how far the situation will escalate, and what sections will be affected in the 





Therefore, the fact that sanctions imposed on Russia due to Russia’s political, 
economic, and military actions in another European country, may have an influence on 
Finland has led to increasing re-evaluations of concepts further than energy security, in 
terms of national security. Indeed, Finland’s lack of NATO membership has come 
under new consideration in recent months, as President Sauli Niinistö stated that ‘an 
overall [security] assessment, including the NATO option, should be made.’ (YLE, 
2014b) Indeed, recent polls show an increase in the number of Finns who are in favour 
of joining NATO, and simultaneously who view Russia as a threat (Hanhivaara, 2014). 
 
As has been stated, Finland relies on other countries for various fossil fuels necessary 
for energy production and the functioning of industry. The extent to which Finland’s 
energy security is endangered by a dependence on Russia is split into two schools of 
thought; first, those who feel Finland is wrapped around Russia’s little finger politically 
and economically, and second, those who feel Finland is strong enough to stand up to 
Russian threats.  
 
Luukkanen’s term ‘in Russia’s pocket’ aptly describes one school of thought in 
considering Finno-Russian relations. While admittedly a shocking term, it, according to 
Luukkanen, describes these post-independence relations well, as first Finland lived as 
neighbours with ‘the bear’, after which in its teeth, and since 1944 in ‘its pocket’ 
(2010:11). Finland, while not considered a post-communist country due to a policy of 
nonalignment does, at times, seem to spiritually lie in Russia’s pocket (Luukkanen, 
2010:11-2). Indeed, the relations between the two countries have never been purely 
political, but have always included strong economic ties, as Russian corporations have 
had great interests in owning Finnish infrastructure, and Finnish companies have made 




Pasternak, 2014) Thus, some state that ‘energy guzzler’ Finland lives on ‘Mother-
Russia’s’ electricity, gas and coal, and that production of energy grovels under Russia’s 
good will (Luukkanen, 2010:132). Therefore, it can be stated that the Finnish 
government’s decision to maintain and increase nuclear power reserves has been used as 
a tool for creating self-sufficiency, if Russia decides to put ‘Finland on her knees with 
energy.’ (Luukkanen, 2010:133) Furthermore, natural gas is taxed with higher tariffs 
than other energy means, which also speaks of ‘secret motivations’ to create energy 
independence (Luukkanen, 2010:138).  
 
However on the other hand, in order to discuss Finnish energy security from a positive 
analytical perspective, Hughes’ four R’s of energy security – review, reduce, replace, 
and restrict – can be utilized to show that although some risks are involved, Finland is 
not the country most at risk in Europe.  Finnish authorities have indeed reviewed the 
problem of energy security, as future possible energy sources have been considered, and 
are already being pursued as is showcased by the Balticconnector LNG terminals which 
will allow Finland to be connected to continental European gas pipes. Seeing as the 
natural resources that Finland exports from various countries, but mostly Russia, are not 
indigenous to Finland, and are, what some would consider an energy security risk 
because they render Finland dependent on imports, the idea of diversifying the origins 
of these resource has been suggested. In diversifying the sources of energy supplies, 
while security of supply has’ not been an issue’ for Finland, and is ‘unlikely to become 
an issue excluding significant escalation in geopolitical conditions’, further 
‘diversification would mean further de-risking’ of even the slightest risks involved 
(Uskola, 2014). Indeed, Finland, like much of Europe, should, due to issues with energy 
security as of late, consider new energy options by means of alternative fuels and new 




capitalism point of view it would be good to have competition’ because in countries 
where gas prices are in competition, lower prices and better contracts are found (2014). 
 
The reduction of energy consumption is also well under way in Finland as the country is 
well on the path of outperforming the EU’s 20-20-20 emissions reductions goals, and 
the use of renewable energy forms is much higher than the EU average.  In terms of 
environmentalism, natural gas is an ecologically friendlier option in comparison to 
domestic peat. Hence, Luukkanen’s argument that if Finland is to be more 
environmentally friendly, the sensible option is to continue the dependence on Russian 
imports of natural gas, while more ecological energies, such as wind power, received 
the attention they deserve from policymakers, is understandable (2010:139). Nowadays, 
with scarcity of sources no longer the primary concern, worries have shifted to the 
continuous copiousness. Thus, the issue of energy security versus that of environmental 
sustainability arises, as it becomes difficult to reduce emissions when consumption 
continues rising.  
 
The replacement of energy methods is where Finland may try to do better. Indeed, the 
lack of fossil fuel resources has been fixed by means of imports and a large reliance on 
nuclear power. Finland’s eagerness to expand on nuclear reflects the similar eagerness 
to cut down on the level of carbon dioxide, as this is seen as the way forward in 
decarbonizing the energy production and usage. Indeed, the nuclear lobby argues that in 
order to tackle climate change, nuclear power can be part of the solution as no carbon 
dioxide, the main component of climate change, is created, unlike with coal and gas 
fired powers plants (Elliot, 2007:1) Nuclear power has, on a global scale, ‘fallen from 
favour’ due to its ‘high costs, and concerns about plant safety and radioactive waste 




nuclear power is a carbon free energy source, it does not come without its own 
downsides; toxic waste material.  This seems very problematic. Waste, that is 
radioactive, and must ‘remain sequestered for a few hundred years in specially 
engineered subsurface facilities,’ does not strike as representing an energy type that is 
environmentally friendly, and thus sustainable (Macfarlane, 2011:30).  
 
While technically sustainable, when a dangerously toxic material is created in the 
process, it seems that the Finnish government, if wanting indeed to make the energy 
market in Finland more environmentally friendly, should, instead of investing in further 
nuclear power plants, invest in even more sustainable energy sources. Granted this is 
being done already, but there is always room for improvement. Indeed, renewable 
energy enthusiasts have argued that renewables could, by the year 2050, provide 50% of 
the total energy requirements of the whole world, while currently nuclear is only able to 
provide 7% (Elliot, 2007:2). The general trend amongst the most thriving of European 
countries has been to phase out of a reliance on nuclear power for energy production 
(Froggatt, 2007:172). Finland, however, stands with France as an exception to this 
trend, both with active construction programmes (Froggatt, 2007:174). Thus, Finland 
and France can be viewed as ‘[vanguards] of the nuclear renaissance.’ (Nuttall, 
2007:230)  
 
The problems with Finland’s strive towards further nuclear power represents itself not 
only as an environmentally risky, possibly catastrophic option, but also in terms of 
national safety. Finnish MEP Heidi Hautala has expressed her concern over the planned 
joint Finno-Russian venture of the Pyhäjoki nuclear plant, as in reference to Russia’s 
role in the Ukrainian crisis that is ongoing, construction cannot be allowed to ‘go 




energy market and the fact that nuclear power is increasingly viewed as favourable, is in 
reality caused by a lack of a ‘critical public sphere independent of the actively inclusive 
state’ which has a ‘consensus-seeking nature of corporatist negotiations’ (Teräväinen et 
al., 2011: 3441). It is not possible to view nuclear power as a fully sustainable energy 
source, and indeed, arguably, ‘all large-scale energy sources currently fail to achieve 
sustainability in some way or another’ (Nuttall, 2007: 221). Finally, in terms of 
restriction, Finland is not one to gamble its energy security. Hence, even though Russia 
has as of late acted towards Ukraine as an unreliable and hostile neighbour, the 
relationship between Russia and Finland is essentially different and much more 
mutually beneficial, and as a result more secure.  
 
Indeed, upon considering the Finland of today as an EU member, the claims made by 
Luukkanen may seem vaguely outlandish. Indeed, when Europe has been affected by 
transportation cuts, most of the effects have been felt by the former Soviet countries in 
Eastern Europe (Uskola, 2014). Finland’s membership in the European Union has, 
without a doubt, greatly increased the energy security of the country. Indeed, while EU 
countries work cohesively, ‘action on the EU level can help governments achieve 
national objectives.’ (Voutilainen, 2008:132) Indeed, the economies of the EU today 
have become thoroughly interlinked and thus cooperation is essential (Faas et al., 
2011:9). The European Council has indeed stated that ‘energy security and 
interconnection have become basic elements of European solidarity.’ (Voutilainen, 
2008:132) Therefore, Finland would aim to actively support EU initiatives, as the 
country’s strategy of ‘realistic pragmatism’ consists of conflict avoidance by finding 





Certain Finnish energy companies have made their stake in international energy 
markets.  Fortum Oyj has become a leading Baltic petroleum company, with also 
‘stakes in oil and gas fields in Norway,’ and Oman, and in terms of electricity Fortum 
has pursued various Northern European markets (Finon et al., 2004: 327-8). 
International trade relations such as these are central for the Finnish economy and 
politics. Indeed, when geopolitical events affect trade partners, the economy may suffer 
as a result. Uskola commented on such circumstances in terms of Russo-Finnish trade, 
and how trade relations have become an important driver of politics; ‘in the start of the 
Ukraine crisis, Finnish stock-listed companies with exposure to [the] Russian market 
were hit hard. It is an indirect signal on [the] importance of the Russian market to the 
Finnish economy’ (Uskola, 2014). Hence, the interlinked nature of the Finnish and 
Russian energy relations and trade can lead to questions of whether current geopolitical 
events may influence Finnish energy security and economy on a greater level.  
 
Using energy as a ‘political weapon’ is a concept discussed by both Russian and 
Western publications (Khrushcheva, 2012:155). It has been argued that the term ‘energy 
weapon’ is too extreme, and that it should not be used to describe EU-Russian energy 
relations. However, Salonius-Pasternak agrees that the usage of the term energy weapon 
is necessary when discussing the act of ‘[gaining] political and economic benefits, much 
like one uses military weapons.’ (2014). Moreover, according to Vihma, while gas can 
be used as a political tool, in the case of Finland it would be ‘pretty ineffective’ since 
Finland does not rely on it so much within the primary energy mix (2014). 
 
Uskola referred to a saying that ‘oil is about wallet, gas is about power’ (2014). This 
rings true in terms of, especially, the Russo-Ukrainian natural gas relations. However in 




geopolitical conflicts,’ seeing as he feels that ‘cutting gas supply would be a very blunt 
and irreversible political weapon.’ (2014) Salonius-Pasternak agreed, as he stated that if 
such an instance would ever occur, it would be a ‘run up to military action or something 
as serious.’ (2014) Russia, however, is always viewed on a geopolitical level as an 
unpredictable player. Indeed, to Russia, energy security is all about Russian national 
welfare, as energy security is viewed as a ‘guaranteed protection of the country, its 
citizens,’ and the state (Esakova, 2012:43). Hence, it is challenging to predict what 
Russia will do next. 
 
5.2. Conclusion 
In conclusion, energy has become an indispensable resource to the way of life humans 
have become accustomed to. Thus, the assurance of energy resources has become 
crucial to each country, and has, as a result of geopolitical instabilities become 
securitized.  Finland lacks domestic sources of fossil fuel energy, and as a result, has to 
import substantial amounts of petrol, natural gas, and other energy sources, such as 
uranium for nuclear power. Hence, Finland has created for herself a dependency on the 
import sources and an issue of energy security. Furthermore, as a result of a lack of 
indigenous fossil fuels resources, Finland has come to rely on vast amounts of growing 
nuclear power in order to produce enough energy for rising consumption and the carbon 
intensive industry.  Moreover, the incessant desire of the majority of the Finnish 
government to continue the growth of the nuclear sector makes the security 
decarbonizing goals questionable, and begs the question whether the reliance on nuclear 
power has been so widely propagated by Finnish policy makers in order to create 
energy security for Finland, instead of creating more dependence on Russian imports by 





Indeed, it makes little sense that one environmental problem - climate change - is being 
solved by creating another, in the form of possible pollution from radioactive materials. 
In comparison, nuclear plants use uranium as fuel while creating waste that is very long 
living and dangerous, while renewables require no fuel to power the energy production, 
and create no waste. This resonates for considerations of hypothetical future scenarios – 
hypothetical only because the timeline is uncertain – of when resources such as uranium 
will be fully exhausted, and the switch to renewables will have to happen in order to 
provide energy for consumers who, so far, have proved unwilling to curb energy 
consumption.  
 
Furthermore, in terms of energy security considerations, the hypotheticals surrounding 
whether or not Russia would ever stop supplies of natural gas remain unanswered. The 
Finnish natural gas situation stands in opposition to commonly agreed EU standards, as 
through a single pipeline and a single transport company, 100% of Finland’s gas 
resources are transported from Russia. However, the share of natural gas usage in the 
larger energy mix is fairly minimal, but for example if gas transports were disrupted in 
winter months, heating homes may prove difficult once backup supplies run out.  
 
However, the usage of gas in Finland is decreasing and admittedly, the importance of 
energy security and gas dependency can be over exaggerated when considering Russian 
and Finnish relations.  The geopolitical aspect of Russian behaviour is often 
highlighted, to the extent that the energy and foreign policies deriving from that are 
forgotten, and critics tend to ‘assume that everything the Kremlin does is geopolitically 
motivated.’ (Huotari, 2011:122) Indeed, these critics underestimate Russian 
considerations of trade, and how important ‘commercial considerations’ are in Russian 




relations with Nordic or West European countries by threatening them with transport 
disruptions.  
 
Further research into the topic of Finnish energy security and energy dependence on 
Russia would benefit from a more in-depth approach to the policies involved in gas 
relations, and also further inspections into the various other energy types in use, as these 
were not possible in the boundaries of this dissertation.   
 
To conclude, Finland’s energy security is not, at the time of writing, endangered by 
Russian geopolitical actions of recent months. However, the effects and extent of these 
geopolitical disturbances are as of yet unknown, and thus energy security must remain a 
priority for Finnish policymakers, as should the advancement of more sustainable forms 
of energy instead of nuclear and CO
2
 fossil fuel formats. The goal should indeed be to 
increase the efficiency of energy in order to make the best out of the renewable energy 
sources at hand, and to stop frivolous energy consumption, instead of creating further 










Appendix I. Interview consent form 
 
Interview Consent Form  
  
Research project topic: Finnish dependency on Russian energy imports, the current 
geopolitical situation (Ukraine and Russia) and how that might affect the historical, economic, 
and political ties between Finland and Russia, and whether or not Finland should aim for self-
sufficiency through more sustainable energy methods  
 
Research investigator: Sanna Mattila 
 
Research Participants name: ________________________________________ 
  
 
The interview will take approximately 15 minutes, possibly longer. We don’t anticipate that 
there are any risks associated with your participation, but you have the right to stop the 
interview or withdraw from the research at any time.  
 
Thank you for agreeing to be interviewed as part of the above research project. Ethical 
procedures for academic research undertaken from UK institutions require that interviewees 
explicitly agree to being interviewed and how the information contained in their interview will 
be used. This consent form is necessary for us to ensure that you understand the purpose of your 
involvement and that you agree to the conditions of your participation. Would you therefore 
read the accompanying information sheet and then sign this form to certify that you approve 
the following:  
 
• the interview will be recorded and a transcript will be produced, upon request 
• you will be sent the transcript and given the opportunity to correct any factual errors  
• the transcript of the interview will be analysed by Sanna Mattila as research investigator  
• access to the interview transcript will be limited to Sanna Mattila and academic 
colleagues and researchers with whom she might collaborate as part of the research 
process  
• the actual recording will be kept for the duration of the study 
• any variation of the conditions above will only occur with your further explicit approval 
 
 
Quotation Agreement  
 
I also understand that my words may be quoted directly. With regards to being quoted, 
please tick next to any of the statements that you agree with: 
 
 I wish to review the notes, transcripts, or other data collected during the research 
pertaining to my participation. 
 I agree to be quoted directly. 
 I agree that the researchers may publish documents that contain quotations by me. 
 
 
By signing this form I agree that; 
1. I am voluntarily taking part in this project. I understand that I don’t have to take part, 
and I can stop the interview at any time; 




3. I have read the Information sheet; 
 
4. I don’t expect to receive any benefit or payment for my participation; 
5. I can request a copy of the transcript of my interview and may make edits I feel 
necessary to ensure the effectiveness of any arguments made; 
6. I have been able to ask any questions I might have, and I understand that I am free to 






















This research has been reviewed and approved by the Edinburgh University Research Ethics 
Board. If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please contact:   
 
             Sanna Mattila    
             Vemmelkuja 4   1F1 14 Warrender Park Road 
             00750 Helsinki   EH9 1JQ Edinburgh 
             +358500462391   +447715460787  
             mattila.sanna@kolumbus.fi  s0838619@sms.ed.ac.uk  
 
 
You can also contact Sanna Mattila’s supervisor: 
 
             Dr Caleb Johnston 
             Institute of Geography 
             School of GeoSciences 
             University of Edinburgh 
             Drummond Street 
             Edinburgh EH8 9XP 
             +44 (0) 131 650 2548 






Appendix II. Interview questions 
Politics / Politiikka  
1. How strongly would you feel domestic politics influences the energy market, or is it 
more business orientated, as in energy companies decide in which countries to invest in 
terms of energy? 
2. Finland as a Nordic country – Finland lingers behind other Nordic countries in terms of 
environmental policies/policy output, why would you say that is? (Because of special 
circumstances of being between Europe and Russia? Young democracy?) 
3. How big of a role do you think private businesses have in the upkeep of relations 
between Finland and Russia? (new report according to YLE states Russia no longer 
Finland’s largest export partner, EXCEPT in energy commodities) 
 
Foreign policy / Ulkopolitiikka 
4. Did joining the EU change Finnish foreign relations policies? 
5. Since joining the EU, do you feel Finland has strictly followed the so-called EU foreign 
policy in terms of Russia, or has she had to have her own policies due to historical and 
proximity reasons? 
6. Do you think Russia would ever “turn off” the tap to Finland? (Seeing as it has to 
Ukraine multiple times) 
7. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned Finland from ‘playing around’ with the idea 
of NATO, if Finland joined, how do you think Russia would react? 
8. According to Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, researcher at Helsinki University, ‘energy 
weapon’ is too strong of a term to describe how Russia has used energy as a foreign 
policy tool, would you agree? (in terms of the EU, been used as a soft tool where 




Security (energy as security policy) / Turvallisuus (energia turvallisuuspolitiikkana) 
9. Does Finland lacking domestic sources of fossil energy and having to import substantial 
amounts of petrol, natural gas, and other energy sources (uranium for nuclear power) 
endanger her national security?  
10. Finland’s gas market arrangements stand in contradiction with EU vision (constrained 
by undiversified import source – one pipeline entry point from Russia, one importer 
Gasum, both owns and operates the network) – should the plans for the new gas 
terminal that would bypass Russian gas thus be rushed because of current geopolitical 
circumstances? 
 
Environment & sustainability / Ympäristoasiat 
11. Should Finland seek to fully transfer gas/coal/oil imports elsewhere?  
12. Finnish CO2 emissions rose by 14.5% between 1990-2004, while rest of Europe’s 
average was -0.6% - could this be the decrease of Russian influence on Finland as a 
result of the fall of the Soviet Union and Finland joining the EU? 
13. How do you think the EU performs as a platform for environmental policy, and how 
have Finnish interests been represented in EU negotiations? 
14. Seeing as Finland is indeed poorly endowed with indigenous hydrocarbon energy 
resources, while also having energy intensive industries and a cold climate do you feel 
that, Finland should invest in more sustainable energy possibilities regardless of the 
current geopolitical situation? 
15. Do you feel that Finland having, comparatively, so much nuclear power is a result of a 
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